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Abstract 
Crop genetic resources (CGRs) are crucial natural resource which ensure food or livelihood secu-
rity of billions of people today as well as ensure future agricultural innovations. However, the CGR 
diversity remaining in in situ, particularly in subsistence farming is becoming extinct due to 
change in economic and technological development over time. An optimal funding strategy is re-
quired for conservation of these CGRs. In this paper, I have discussed an economic perspective on 
why and how the de facto crop genetic resources (CGRs) diversity declines with changing econom-
ic and environmental context. The model maximizes the net revenue from the farmers land alloca-
tion strategy to different CGRs under economic and technical constraints with linear demand and 
cost functions. Furthermore, the model suggests how to minimize the cost of on farm conservation 
of these crop genetic resources in situ (or ex situ) without forfeiting farmer’s well-being in a chang- 
ing perspective of economics and technology. The theoretical model developed in this study is 
employed to demonstrate the applicability for on farm conservation of rice genetic diversity in 
Nepal. The study suggests an optimal fund allocation strategy that minimizes the cost of conserva-
tion by (i) identifying particular CGRs (rice landraces) that are prone to extinct from the commu-
nity and (ii) categorizing the farmers in the community having minimum cost of conservation for 
those particular landraces. As the model maximizes the farmers’ revenues, it could ensure better 
livelihood of individuals in the community while minimizing the cost of in situ conservation of 
biodiversity on farm. 
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1. Introduction 
Crop genetic diversity (agrobiodiversity), a subset of biodiversity, is simply defined as the diversity in crop ge-
netic resources (CGRs) that are being cultivated by farming communities on their farm and the wild species that 
are potential for domestication [1]-[3]. These crop genetic resources are crucial natural resource which ensure 
food or livelihood security to billions of people today as well as future agricultural innovations [4] because such 
agricultural genetic resources possess many useful characteristics like resistancy to disease pest, high yield trait, 
stress tolerance [5] [6]. Much of the crop genetic diversity remaining in situ1 today is found on the semi-subsis- 
tence farms2 of poor countries and the small-scale farms of industrialized countries [10]-[14]. Such de facto 
conservation of biodiversity is mainly for risk aversion from the production environmental uncertainty [15] and 
partly because of sociocultural, environmental, and production heterogeneity such as soil type, irrigation availa-
bility [1] [16] [17]. 
Conservation of such genetic resource diversity is well recognized and international agreements such as Con-
vention on Biological Diversity (CBD) and International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agri-
culture (ITPGRFA) encourage the design of policies that convey economic incentives for farmers to conserve 
these important environmental assets in situ. In situ conservation approach is dynamic in nature allowing the 
genes to evolve and alter subjected to the exposed environment thus adding value over the ex situ3 conservation. 
Hence, conservation of such CGRs in situ (on farm) is considered crucial over the ex situ (gene bank). 
Large numbers of national and international agencies are employing many different strategies to conserve 
these resources in situ worldwide as suggested and promoted by the international treaties such as Convention on 
Biological Diversity (CBD) and United Nations Environment Program (UNEP). However, most of these con-
servation approaches consider some non-economic incentives to the farmers such as creating awareness through 
trainings and granting right to the farmers for conservation [2] [20] [21]. These strategies are myopic in nature 
and hardly consider the net revenue from the farming activities while implementing these conservation projects 
and programs. But there are empirical evidences that farmers are increasingly reluctant to provide this form of 
conservation [22], and that in the absence of counteracting policy [23], economic development (availability of 
modern varieties, risk abatement options) will further reduce the farmers’ incentives to do so [24]. In short, in 
situ conservation (previously provided by individual farmers as a matter of choice, the de facto diversity) con-
tinues to decline on account of the development of agriculture worldwide [22] [25] [26]. Therefore, it can be ar-
gued that with the increasing food requirement, availability of the high yielding variety (HYV), risk abatement 
technology and increased access to income sources, farmers will replace the local diversity with HYV, thus los-
ing whole biodiversity if the net revenue increases from the latter option. 
This justifies that the well-considered argument for conservation should not only be based on ecological 
grounds but also on economic grounds [27] [28] because of the two reasons. First, the farming communities have 
to maintain their livelihoods through the use of the farm and its amenities (includes genetic materials); second, 
the financial resources for conservation programs are not sufficient to protect all genes and species [29]. 
Considering the threat of biodiversity extinction, a vast majority of studies have suggested a number of in-
struments for its conservation that provide economic incentives to the farmers both considering the financial li-
mitations and farmers’ economic losses. Pascual and Perrings [30] and UNEP [31] present detailed instruments 
for conservation of biodiversity. Some instruments include payment of ecosystems services (PES), the contract-
ing out of conservation area, direct compensation, and tradable development rights etc. These instruments pro-
vide economic incentives to the farmers and promote conservation of biodiversity on farm. Of the many instru-
ments suggested, compensation to the farmers for the foregone opportunity cost of growing HYV is one of the 
best economic instruments [31]-[33]. This instrument is not only simple to apply but also helps to measure the 
current diversity that maximize total productivity of the farm, helps to anticipate the possible risk of diversity 
loss due to changing economic and technological constraints and helps to minimize the cost of conservation. 
In this paper a general model is suggested that predicts the farmers’ land allocation for different crop varieties 
that maximize farm revenues under different economics and technological constraints and identifies the total lo-
 
 
1In situ conservation of agricultural biodiversity can be defined as the choice by farmers to continue managing crop genetic resources in their 
communities, in the agro-ecosystems, where they have evolved historically through processes of human and natural selection [7] [8]. 
2While there is no universal definition [9], we consider subsistence farming or semi-subsistence farming as a self-sufficiency farming in 
which the farmers focus on growing enough food to feed themselves and their families. 
3Ex situ conservation involves conservation of CGRs components outside their natural habitats, i.e. off-farm, generally in gene banks [18]. 
Conservation at ex situ is static in nature and do not allow for evolutionary process [19]. 
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cal CGR/landraces4 or genes that are required to be compensated. Since in situ conservation is not a sector-wide 
phenomenon, it should be focused on the key regions that contain maximum diversity. Noting this fact, the 
theoretical model is employed to demonstrate the applicability of the model for on farm conservation of rice ge-
netic diversity in Nepal. The study suggests an optimal fund allocation strategy that minimizes the cost of con-
servation by (i) identifying particular CGRs (rice landraces) that are prone to extinct from the community and (ii) 
categorizing the farmers in the community having minimum cost of conservation for those particular landraces. 
As the model maximizes the farmers’ revenues, it could ensure better livelihood of individuals in the community 
while minimizing the cost of in situ conservation of biodiversity on farm. 
2. The Model 
Farmers have preferences of either diversifying the farm by growing multiple crops or varieties or growing few 
crops or sometime even a single crop or single variety. While allocating land to different varieties of a crop, 
farmers take into account the vectors of production cost and the productivity which depends on the characteris-
tics of land, characteristics of crop varieties, or the possible risk measure options availability [15]. They also 
take into account of market price determined by culinary characteristics, and other sociocultural characteristics 
of the varieties [2] [38]. Since, different crop varieties respond differently to environmental or market risks, 
risk-averse farmers may choose to control their risk exposure through diversification [15] [39] [40]. 
Let π  represents the farmers’ revenue that depends on the choice of crop varieties, N. It consists of land al-
location decision and vector of technical inputs (such as fertilizers, pesticides, labor, etc.). Farm land al- 
tion 𝑥𝑥, is determinant of on farm biodiversity. Therefore, the farm land allocation x is decision variable that de-
termines the on farm diversity and in turn total crop genetic diversity in the community. Let M be a given com-
munity, where 1:j m=  are the farmers in that community and N with 1:i n= , be total crop varieties (modern 
and local landraces) within the community. Farming communities want to maximize their revenue (profits) from 
their farmland given the level of crop genetic diversity, assuming that the input vectors (costs), the productivity, 
and the market price of the variety/landraces are known to all the farmers in the community. 
Based on the profit maximizing theory (where “utility” is the sole function of profit), the overall objective 
function can then be formulated as a linear programing (LP) problem [41]: 
1 1 1 1
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and non-negativity constraints: 
0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0;ij ij ij i ij j jy c s p x b η≥ ≥ ≥ ≥ ≥ ≥ ≥  
where, 
ijx  is the decision variable, land allocated for landrace/variety i by farmer j; 
ijy  is yield of landrace/variety i in farmland of farmer j; 
ijc  is per unit cost of production of landrace/variety i in farmland of farmer j; 
ijs  is land quality suitable for landrace/variety i in farmland of farmer j; 
ip  is market price of landrace/variety i; 
jb  is the land availability for farmer j; 
 
 
4Landraces are local crop varieties with a high capacity to tolerate biotic and abiotic stresses resulting in high yield stability and an interme-
diate yield level under a low input agricultural system [34]. These are often highly variable in appearance, but they are each identifiable and 
usually have local names. The genetic variation within the landrace may be considerable but is far from random [35] [36]. Being heteroge-
neous, landraces do not meet the criteria for distinct, uniform and stable (DUS) characteristics that are required to be defined as modern va-
rieties [37]. 
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jη  is the budget limit for farmer j. 
Equation (*) maximizes total farm revenue in the community which in-turn maximizes the individual farmers’ 
benefits. Equations (1)-(3) are farmers’ resource constraints. Constraint (1) is total land available to the farmers 
to grow different varieties of crop. The land resource is finite, given that no conversion of natural land into cul-
tivation is allowed which is a very reasonable assumption. Constraint (2) is an economic constraint or budget 
constraint. This is the total expendable budget farmer can use in purchasing input vectors for different crop va-
rieties. Since, different landraces/varieties require different costs for growing in different land parcels, farmers 
with enough income/budgets may choose to grow input intensive or high yielding variety(s), whereas farmers 
with smaller budget must choose low input varieties/landraces. Constraint (3) is environmental constraint that 
forces farmers to grow many different varieties in different land parcels. For instance, a farmer j can’t allocate 
all his farmland to only a variety𝑖𝑖because some land parcels are not suitable to grow that variety due to poor soil 
fertility, irrigation requirement, flooding, physical stress or similar reasons. Therefore, the farmer allocates such 
land to varieties that are resistant to these environmental stress and risk factors, thus diversifying land allocation 
to many landraces/varieties and increases the biodiversity. This plays very important role for conserving local 
genetic resources in diverse environment niches. 
3. Application of the Models 
To illustrate the model, I have taken data from 15 farmers from Kaski district of Nepal5, where high genetic di-
versity exists. There are nine rice varieties, of which eight are local varieties/landraces (to be conserved) and one 
modern or high yielding variety. These different rice varieties have different cost of production, different prod-
uctivity in different land parcels. The cost and production might vary among farmers based on the land type, for 
instance a good land parcel might need less cost and produce more while the poor parcel need much higher cost 
for same variety to produce same quantity or might not be suitable for that variety at all. The market price is 
different for different variety but usually do not depend on the production (fixed demand), particularly in such 
subsistence farming systems. Farmers always have finite cultivable land resource, finite budget for purchasing 
input vectors and different categories of land parcels. Such information can be collected using the intensive data 
plot (IDP) method6 which can minimize the asymmetry in information collection. 
4. Results and Discussions 
The model application results are divided in different cases to shed lights on the economics of de facto diver-
sity, the anticipated economic reasons of declining diversity over time and strategies for conservation on 
farm. 
4.1. Case 1: The De facto Biodiversity 
The diversity conserved on farm at the current resource constraint level, without any attention of conservation is 
considered as the de facto diversity on farm. If each farmer maximizes their profit given their land constraints 
(1), budget constraints (2) and the land suitability constraint (3), the total crop land allocated to different crop 
landraces can be obtained. This is illustrated by employing the data set obtained from the rice farming commu-
nity of Nepal. An application of the model clearly shows that the net revenue of the farmers in the community is 
maximized when the land is allocated different landraces. This leads to the conservation of all the rice landraces 
(Table 1) at the given economic and environmental constraints level. Although sufficiently large area is allo-
cated to local landraces, the land allocation to modern variety (Mansuli) is much higher compared to the local 
varieties (Table 2). For example 123 Ropani7 land is allocated Mansuli (HYV) compared to a maximum of 36  
 
 
5The data set is chosen from a large data set for illustration and reduced to small number due to insufficient information because the data 
were collected for another research by the author. The data were collected using standard survey questionnaire at household level. The de-
tails of the data collection are discussed in Poudel and Johnsen [18]. However, I would like to reiterate that only 15 farmers information are 
used for the illustration of the applicability of the model in this study. The data set can be available from the authors upon request. This 
study area, in Kaski district of Nepal, is reported to be a hot spot in terms of crop diversity [42]. The major crop is rice (Oryza sativa). Al-
most all the farmers grow this crop for which the farmers are maintaining a large number of local landraces [42] [43] along with some im-
proved high yielding varieties. 
6IDP is participatory data collection method where both researchers and farmers involve directly and simultaneously during the period of 
collection [1] [44]. 
7Ropani is a local unit, where 20 ropani is equal to 1 hectare. 
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Table 1. Maximum revenue and maximum number of crop landraces in different constraining case scenarios.               
Different Case Maximum Revenue Number of Landraces Remarks 
Case I 461,914 All (8) Constraints 1, 2 and 3 active 
Case IIa† 585,545 7 Constraints 1, 2 and 4 active 
Case IIb†† 653,600 6 Constraints 1, 5 and 6 active 
Case IIc 679,451 4 Only constraints 1 active 
Case III 664,388 All (8) Constraints 1 and 7 active 
Full constraints 461,203 All (8) All constraints 1, 2, 3 and 7 active 
†α = 0.25, ††α = 0.25, and β = 0.25. 
 
Table 2. Land allocation (Ropani) for different varieties and landraces in the community in different constraining case sce-
narios.                                                                                                 
Landrace Case I Case IIa Case IIb Case IIc Case III 
Ekle 26.91(3)‡ 21.5(2) 22(2) 20(1) 20(1) 
Gurdi 34(3) 0(0) 0(0) 0(0) 10(1) 
Madese 36(2) 14(2) 0(0) 0(0) 10(1) 
Jetho 17(4) 19.5(5) 23.5(6) 28.5(2) 10.5(2) 
Anadi 13(2) 15.5(3) 10.66(3) 10(1) 10(1) 
Pahele 13.17(3) 15.75(3) 10(1) 0(0) 10(2) 
Bayarni 18(3) 14.5(4) 8.75(1) 19(1) 19(1) 
Jarneli 4(1) 11.5(2) 3.625(1) 0(0) 10(1) 
Mansuli 123(12) 173(14) 206(14) 208(10) 186(8) 
‡Figures in parentheses are number of farmers cultivating landrace or variety. 
 
Ropani for Gurdi landrace. The main reason for the cultivation of modern variety is a higher profit arising from 
it. However, the farmers cannot allocate their land to modern varieties because either their land is not suitable 
and/or it requires higher input levels. Furthermore, these farmers cannot buy insurance and therefore, they diver-
sify the crop varieties as a natural insurance policy, that leads to high diversity, which strongly holds the claim 
by Meng [39] and Di Falco and Perrings [15]. This leads to a de facto conservation of crop genetic resources 
diversity on farm. This justifies that the present biodiversity in developing countries is due to the economic and 
the environmental constraints. Given the result, we can conclude that the de facto conservation of biodiversity is 
governed by the economic and environmental constraints of the farmers, namely the budget constraint (2) and 
land suitability constraint (3). 
4.2. Case 2: Is the De Facto Diversity Declining? 
Most of the crop genetic diversities are retained in the least developed countries where food deficit is a major 
problem [4] [10] [13]. Food security is the responsibility of the state [45]. The state’s first and most important 
role is to ensure better livelihood and improve the welfare of farming communities through increased and effi-
cient technological development. The governments of these poor countries need to deal with the problem of food 
deficiency through appropriate technological development such as by developing modern crop varieties, lower-
ing risks and uncertainties through improved farming, or by generating employment in the country. Such possi-
ble economic and technological development could relax or even inactivate some of the above mentioned con-
straint because; 
• Access to cheaper inputs reduces the budget constraint: Access to cheaper inputs such as fertilizers, irriga-
tion system, and pesticides availability could be increased overtime due to technological improvement such 
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as cheaper transportation cost and mechanization in farming system. This eases the access to inputs and re-
quire lower budget and hence farmers can grow input intensive modern varieties thus decreasing the local 
genetic diversity where otherwise they would have been growing low yielding local varieties. 
• Increased income reduces the budget constraint: Due to the economic development of the nation, people’s 
income could rise and so does the farmers investment capacity thus the budget constraint particularly in such 
subsistence farming can be relaxed in the future. 
• Cheaper credit market reduces the budget constraint: The increased and easy access to credits for farming 
will reduce the budget constraint since farmer’s can purchase the required inputs and grow input incentive 
varieties instead of growing low input local variety. 
• New modern variety available for different land type: The government and the public breeding companies 
are continuously working to develop high yielding varieties (HYVs) that can be grown in the diverse niches. 
This means in the long term, many different high yielding varieties will be available for growing in all the 
niches of land parcels thus increasing farm productivity but replacing low yielding local varieties. 
• Access to cheaper insurance policy than natural insurance: Currently, farmers are diversifying the farm to 
reduce loss from the epidemic and other natural factors. However, as long as cheap insurance options are 
available, they may keep growing high yielding uniform crop varieties on their farm, thus losing local crop 
diversity. 
Given the possibility of constraints dynamics overtime, the farmers could maximize their farm revenue diffe-
rently due to the change in their model constraints. 
Case IIa: Suppose that due to the change in income or cheaper access to inputs, the farmers’ real income is 
increased by α percent in the previous income and this will relax the budget constraint (3), which can simply be 
modified as: 
( )
1
1 ,
n
ij ij j
i
c x jη α
=
= + ∀∑                                         (4) 
Case IIb: Furthermore assume that due to economic and technological development, the subsistence farming 
could be changed into mechanization and the real income increased by 2α, a further relaxation in budget con-
straint. Let β percent of the previously unsuitable land can be converted into suitable for high yielding or the 
high quality variety due to the improvement of new varieties and improved irrigation and accessibility of fertili-
zation. In this case, constraint (2) and constraint (3) can be modified as (4) and (5): 
( )
1
1 2 ,
n
ij ij j
i
c x jη α
=
= + ∀∑                                      (5) 
( )1 , ,ij ijx S i jβ≤ + ∀                                         (6) 
Case IIc: Finally, assume that a further relaxation of budget constraints such as access to full insurance, 
access to new modern varieties of the crops, the only constraint to maximize the farm revenue is the availability 
of land, constraint (1) but not budget and land suitability constraints. 
An application of the model to maximize the objective function (*) subjected to new sets of constraints, in-
creases the farm revenue because the farmer could choose high yielding and good quality variety or landraces 
due to relaxed or inactive constraints. Availability of these options, the subsistence farmers replace the local ex-
isting varieties with HYVs thus causing a serious decline in de facto biodiversity. 
Table 1 shows how the landraces in the community decrease due to the economic and technological change 
that helps in relaxation of the model constraints and increase the farm revenue due to change in crop varieties. If 
the farmers income increases or the input price decreases (apparently increase in real income), and suppose the 
budget constraint is relaxed i.e. budget is increased by α fraction, the net revenue from the farming increases 
while the number of local crop varieties will decreases (Case IIa). If the farmers’ income further increases (bud- 
get is added up by 2α) and the farmers improve the land such that β fraction of land parcels can now be allo-
cated for different high yielding, high quality varieties (the land suitability constraint is relaxed), the profit fur-
ther increases, whereas, the number of crop varieties will be decreased by two (Case IIb). Furthermore, if both 
economic and environmental constraints are inactive, the revenue further increases while the number of crop va-
rieties cultivated is reduced to four, thus clearly leading to a loss of genetic diversity from the community. 
Table 2 shows the land allocation to different varieties and the number of farmers growing these varieties 
under different model constraint scenarios. The land allocated to local varieties is decreasing and finally no land 
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will be allocated for four of the local landraces (for example, Gurdi, Madhese, Pahele and Jarneli) if the eco-
nomic and environmental constraints are inactive in the model. All the farmers cultivate modern variety when-
ever the budget meets the cost requirement and land is suitable for this variety. It can also be seen that only four 
local varieties will remain in the community out of eight varieties if there is no budgetary and land suitability 
constraints in the long-run with economic and technical development. 
Table 3 shows how the number of crop landraces or varieties decreases on individual’s farm when there are 
no production constraints. Highest number of varieties is maintained by the farmers when all the production 
constraints are active (Case I), while the least in Case IIc where no economic and environmental constraints are 
active. Most of the farmers would be growing single variety to maximize the total revenue, if they have no pro-
duction constraints. This is the characteristics of the mechanized and well developed farming system where the 
local genetic diversity has already been lost. 
This predicts that whatsoever the other factors are, the major force that drives farmers in choosing crop varie-
ties is gross socioeconomic incentives (net farm revenue) from the crop varieties also mentioned by Benin et al. 
[46], i.e. farmers maximize the benefits from the land allocations to the crops and varieties now and in the future. 
This suggests that modernization or industrialization of the farming system could narrow down the genetic di-
versity from the agricultural landscapes [47]. Now we can conclude that the de facto biodiversity decreases with 
economic and technological development leading to an increase in the farm revenue in the long-run. 
4.3. Case 3: The Biodiversity Conservation 
Coping with food insecurity and ensuring on-farm conservation of genetic resources is much more difficult and 
challenging issue. The intervention of the modern technology could not be halted because it is important to feed 
the increasing population of the world through increased agricultural productivity from the finite land resource 
[48]. The only instrument that can be used for conservation of these genetic resources on farm is to provide 
economic incentives to the farmers as a compensation for conservation. The conservation is achieved by enforc-
ing a new constraint to cultivate these landraces on farm. For conservation of plant genetic resources on farm, 
requires a Minimum Viable Population (MVP) of that species because the size of a population planted by a far-
mer will affect the amount of genetic variation of the crop population over time [49]-[51]. The smaller the pop-
ulation, the more likely that genetic drift, inbreeding, loss of alleles, and stochastic events will affect the popula-
tion [49] [52]-[54]. The population for conservation of such diversity depends on several factors such as the bi-
ological growth habit of species, the survivability and reproductive coefficient, the environmental niches and so 
on. Particularly for conservation of Crop Genetic Resources (CGRs) on farm, the genetic variability mainten-
ance is most important along with other factors. Given the minimum viable population constraint, the problem 
can be specified as: 
1
,
m
ij i
j
x r i
=
= ∀∑                                       (7) 
where ir  is the land allocation requirement for landrace i to maintain MVP. 
The constraint (7) required for dynamic variability on farm which can be maintained by allocating minimum 
farmland for a particular species. Suppose landrace i is required to be produced in the community of farmers j, 
the total land allocated for that variety should be at least r unit assuming that the government has the right to se- 
lect and enforce any farmer in community to allocate land for the local variety. 
 
Table 3. Number of varieties and landraces grown by individual farmers in different constraining case scenarios.            
Farmers F01 F02 F03 F04 F05 F06 F07 F08 F09 F10 F11 F12 F13 F14 F15 
Case I 3 2 2 3 2 1 3 1 3 2 3 1 3 1 3 
Case IIa 3 2 2 3 2 1 2 1 4 2 2 1 3 5 2 
Case IIb 3 2 2 3 2 1 2 1 2 2 2 1 2 2 1 
Case IIc 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 
Case III 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 
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Due to the addition of the new constraints, where the conservation agency such as government implement a 
minimum viable population (MVP)8 constraint, all of the landraces can be conserved in the community. However, 
due to the cultivation of low yielding local varieties, farmers’ net revenue decreases (Table 1). This could affect 
the livelihoods of those farmers who are required to grow these varieties. This loss to farmers can be defined as 
the foregone opportunity cost. We can conclude that the conservation of CGR diversity on farm is possible by 
enforcing a conservation constraint in the community. The landraces can be increased but in the cost of de-
creased welfare. 
5. Cost of Conservation and Optimal Allocation of Funds 
Since the farmers possess property right over their farmland and government is responsible for the improvement 
of the farmers’ livelihood, the forgone opportunity cost of those farmers who are enforced to grow these lan-
draces should be compensated. The foregone opportunity cost is the difference in net revenue (net profit), before 
and after the enforcement of the constraints. This can be calculated as: 
0Conservation Cost cπ π= −                                     (8) 
where 
0π  is the total profit without MVP constraint (Case IIc), 
cπ  is the total profit with the MVP constraint (Case III). 
This is the minimum cost for conservation of crop genetic diversity on farm. Furthermore, mankind simply 
cannot protect everything. An effort to conserve everything won’t be the sustainable solution [60]. This requires 
choosing an optimal level to be conserved in order to maximize net revenue from the diversity and minimize 
cost of such conservation. Therefore it is important to identify those crop varieties/species that are superior (low 
cost, high yielding or high priced) over the new modern varieties and are usually preferred by the farmers. The 
model presented above can identify the farmers in the community having minimum cost of conservation along 
with crop landraces that has least cost among all. A landrace that requires minimum cost of conservation should 
be selected for compensation, followed by second landrace and so on until entire budget allocated is spent. Lan-
draces those require higher cost of conservation should be considered for other options of conservation such as 
ex situ or allele conservation. 
By the application of the selected model in this particular example, out of the fifteen farmers studied only four 
farmers are required to be enforced for growing landraces for conservation, given the current availability of sin-
gle modern variety in the community. However, due to the cultivation of these landraces there is a reduction in 
net revenue of the farmers which is the foregone opportunity cost or the conservation costs for these landraces. 
The cost of conservation of crop landraces in the community are calculated using Equation (8) and the total cost 
is NRs 15063. Individual cost of conservation varies among landraces and farmers (Table 4). Of the four far-
mers, the highest cost is incurred by “Farmer 06” who is growing Jarneli landrace, while the cost of growing 
Madhese landrace is least. Based on this opportunity cost of growing these landraces, the conservation fund should 
be allocated to conserve Madhese, Pahele, Gurdi and Jarneli landraces on the least cost priority. The remaining 
four landraces are either highly productive or they are better quality compared to the new available modern va-
riety. These local landraces will be grown by the farmers in the community whatever the economic and envi-
ronmental constraints are. This model can be useful to identify the crop landraces that are required to compen-
sate and suggests efficient compensation mechanism. 
The compensation cost is much lower and efficient as compared to a lump sum compensation that otherwise 
required to pay for all the eight landraces in the community. Furthermore, in case of limitation of funds for con-
servation, this model deals on the prioritization of the landraces to be conserved on farm. For instance in this 
particular example, if our conservation fund is NRs 10000, the policy maker can easily make decision to avoid 
on farm conservation of the Jarneli landrace (Table 4) and find alternative conservation approach such as ex situ 
 
 
8Although no specific study about the requirement of minimum viable population (MVP) for rice (Oryza Sativa) is available, a rough esti-
mation can be made based on Traill et al. [55]. Given the planting density of rice, it can be estimated that cultivation in 250 m2 area contains 
around 5000 plants which is the minimum viable population for most of the monocotyledons species. Furthermore, in situ conservation of 
self-pollinated crops such as rice, MVP and inbreeding depression may not be more relevant [56], rather it requires to preserve the process 
of crop evolution via natural hybridization with wild and other varieties, natural selection, genetic drift. This demands large amount of cul-
tivation area and diverse environment within the community where it is to be conserved. Many findings [1] [57]-[59] suggest that 0.25 to 0.5 
ha farmland is required for maintenance of minimum population for rice to create the genetic variability and natural evolution overtime for 
conservation of a rice landrace in the community. Therefore, I have chosen a value of 0.5 ha in this illustration. 
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Table 4. Farmer and landraces having the highest cost of conservation.                                             
Farmers Landraces (area) Conservation costs (NRs) 
F04 Gurdi (10) 3275 
F06 Jarneli (10), Pahele (2) 8268 
F05 Pahele (8) 1760 
F11 Madhese (10) 1760 
Total All 15,063 
 
conservation. From the illustrations, we can conclude that the cost of conservation can be minimized through the 
identification of the landraces and the farmers that have minimum cost of cultivation. 
6. Concluding Remarks 
This study suggests the de facto of crop genetic diversity in subsistence farming is governed by the economic 
and environmental constraints of the farmers in the community. It shows that farmers have both economic and 
environmental constraints for maximization of their net revenue from farming activities. Their choice on crop 
biodiversity would be to maximize net revenue from allocation of land resources to these diverse varieties and 
landraces given such constraints. This leads to a de facto conservation of biodiversity on farm particularly in 
developing countries and subsistence farming. However, the de facto biodiversity remaining in situ could extinct 
due to economic and technological development that creates higher economic return from farming of new ge-
netic materials. Therefore, economic incentive is required to conserve these genetic diversities in the same com- 
munity, a criteria suggested by Pascual et al. [33] and UNEP [31]. The theoretical model developed in this study 
can be applied to identify particular landraces that are prone to extinct from the community. It further identifies 
farmers in the community having a minimum cost of conservation for these particular landraces such that the 
conservation cost is minimized. As the model maximizes the farmers revenues, could ensure better livelihood 
of individuals in the community as well as help to minimize the cost of in situ conservation of biodiversity on 
farm. 
7. Future Research and Issues 
Although this is a simple model, the example of application shows that it can applied easily to identify the far-
mers and varieties that minimize the cost of conservation. Therefore, there is ample space to apply the model in 
field studies to optimize the conservation costs in conservation programs. However, the major problem in field 
application could be to obtain the reliable data because farmers can exaggerate the information to acquire more 
compensation from the authorities. To ensure the collection of accurate information, suitable approaches such as 
intensive data plot (IDP) approach [1] [44] could be employed. 
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